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Introduction
This paper is motivated by venture capital contracting to examine time-contingent compensation in a principal-agent model. Contracted payments of equity shares to an entrepreneur are often vested over time, or paid out only after the entrepreneur has remained with a …rm for a speci…ed time period. If the entrepreneur quits or is …red from the …rm prematurely, unvested shares are not paid to the entrepreneur; however the entrepreneur keeps any shares already vested. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) show that vesting is extensively used in venture capital contracts in association with the risks of general uncertainty, asymmetric information, project complexity, and potential hold-up between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur.
In addition, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) show that when contingent control rights are used, vesting is most common. We study a model in which an entrepreneur has inalienable human capital required for a project to succeed. Project cash ‡ows and the entrepreneur's e¤ort actions and quality type are fully revealed in the long run. Paying the entrepreneur contingent on the project's …nal outcome would provide the greatest e¤ort incentives and screening against asymmetric information of types. Correspondingly, equity compensation vested over the long run would pay the entrepreneur contingent on the project outcome, conditional on the entrepreneur not being …red for being a bad type.
However, we show that a hold-up problem between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist implies that contracts are incomplete and subject to repudiation. Equity paid to the entrepreneur, whether vested over a short or long period of time, has limited incentives to induce e¤ort actions. Short-term vesting, which is equity compensation paid contingent on the entrepreneur not leaving the …rm over a short term, has no standard equity incentives for future e¤ort due to ex-post bargaining. Long-term vesting, which is equity compensation paid contingent on the entrepreneur not leaving the …rm over a long term, has …xed equity incentives for e¤ort but is not ex-ante contractible due to hold-up.
In order to examine the ability to induce e¤ort when there is hold-up, we introduce an innovative model of e¤ort in which a contractible project choice determines the optimum e¤ort that is consistent with repudiation-proof contracts. Short-term vesting can give the entrepreneur incentives to choose an e¤ort-intensive project under which e¤ort is taken. However, short-term vesting reduces the screening against bad entrepreneur types, giving a trade-o¤ between e¤ort incentives and a separating equilibrium with the screening out of bad types.
Contingent control rights protect the entrepreneur from hold-up and are complementary to long-term vesting of equity. We show that a new explanation for the link between equity cash ‡ow claims and control rights is that residual equity control is necessary to protect residual equity claims from hold-up. Control rights provide the greatest incentives for e¤ort, beyond 1 that which can be provided by short-term vesting. But control rights operate over "bundled" actions, for which individual control rights cannot be distinguished. The result is that control rights give the holder the ability to divert cash ‡ows, which implies that control rights reduce screening more than short-term vesting. Short-term vesting is a partial substitute for control rights that gives lower e¤ort incentives and greater screening capability.
We examine the trade-o¤ between incentives and screening within the context of a model of venture capital contracting, but this result is likely to hold in corporate contracting in general.
For example, consider a CEO who has inalienable human capital due to …rm-speci…c knowledge.
To provide full e¤ort incentives, the CEO's entire future compensation has to be contracted ex-ante with full credibility. Though typically some components of CEO compensation, such as equity or options, may be granted for several years in advance, often the salary and bonus are determined each year, implying that contracts are not complete. Numerous cases of CEOs receiving ex-post readjusted option grants and terms suggest the potential for hold-up by CEOs. In contrast, this paper suggests that large up-front compensation, such as backdated inthe-money-options, or control rights, such as appointing the CEO as chairman of the board, which may appear to be excessive if contracts were complete, may actually help alleviate holdup problems by giving the CEO incentives to choose an e¤ort-intensive project choice ex-ante.
Regardless, there may be a trade-o¤ in that these methods for providing greater e¤ort lessen the screening against bad CEO types.
We also derive results about the trade-o¤ of ex-ante and interim asymmetric information.
Greater incentives through short-term vesting or contingent control to the entrepreneur reduce screening and lead to pooling equilibria. The cost of pooling increases with the ex-ante probability that an entrepreneur is a bad type. This is due to both the higher chance the bad type receives …nancing, and the chance the bad type is not detected by a noisy interim signal and so receives short-term vesting or contingent control by which he can divert funds. The cost of pooling also increases with the noise of the signal. This is because bad types are more likely to look for …nancing knowing that they are less likely to be caught by the noisy signal later, and bad types are indeed caught less often and so receive short-term vesting or contingent control allowing them to divert funds. When the cost of pooling is large enough from either more bad types or a noisier signal, contingent control is not given to the entrepreneur, but the entrepreneur is given large short-term vesting. As the cost increases further, short-term vesting is reduced. Withholding control from the entrepreneur and reducing short-term vesting increasingly lowers e¤ort incentives, until …nally no e¤ort occurs.
There is an opposite e¤ect between the two causes for increased costs of pooling on whether bad types look for …nancing in equilibrium. As the probability of bad types increases, the reduction in short-term vesting and ability to divert funds lowers bad types'desire to look for …nancing, resulting in a separating equilibrium. Conversely, as the signal quality decreases, bad types …nd it increasingly attractive to look for …nancing and bear the decreasing risk of being caught even though short-term vesting or ability to divert funds is decreased. The di¤erence in the direction of the e¤ects is because in the limit, when there are only bad types, e¤ort incentives are worthless and so not worth paying for due to the loss from funding bad types. But even when the signal loses all quality and becomes uninformative, it may still be worthwhile to provide incentives for e¤ort for the good types despite the losses of funding bad types.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 shows repudiation results, limited optimal results, and focuses on suboptimal results that obtain for more typical entrepreneurial projects. This section analyzes short-term vesting and control in the trade-o¤ of the cost of pooling and incentives for e¤ort, and highlights the special features of control. Section 5 concludes with further interpretations of the model. The repudiation assumption and robustness to the timing of events are discussed in Appendix A, and proofs are in Appendix B.
Related Literature
In a model of capital structure and security design, Aghion and Bolton (1992) show control may need to be contingent to implement optimal actions in the …rm. We reach this result and also show how short-term vesting of equity or long-term vesting that is protected by entrepreneur control also helps implement optimal actions when there is asymmetric information. In our model, no action is dependent on the state as in Grossman and Hart (1994) or Aghion and Bolton (1992), but we have unveri…ability of actions that leads to incomplete contracts and hold-up. The venture capitalist does not observe the state, but she does observe actions. Hart (2001) questions why the agent necessarily receives control in a good state and the principal receives control in a bad state, which is also empirically demonstrated in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) , rather than based solely on personal bene…ts as in Aghion and Bolton (1992) . He suggests what may be missing from the model is e¤ort that needs to be rewarded and implicitly requires entrenchment. We …nd this result, and also show that ex-ante asymmetric information drives the result as well.
Models of debt with unveri…able cash ‡ows and liquidation rights given to investors, including Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Moore (1994, 1998) , are somewhat similar to our model in that ours has a potential interim unveri…able cash ‡ow and entrepreneurial human capital with potential hold-up of the investor, which necessitates that the entrepreneur cannot receive full payments up-front. However, this is counter-balanced by the entrepreneur's needs for up-front payments or control rights for e¤ort incentives due to potential reverse holdup by the investor. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Berkovitch and Israel (1996) examine the joint aspect of cash ‡ow and control rights in the context of multiple classes of security holders, but they do not explain the timing of cash ‡ows. Diamond (1991) shows that better borrower types prefer short-term debt because their liquidity risk of losing non-pledgeable rents is smaller.
The structure of our model is related to Neher (1999) , who examines a hold-up problem involving an entrepreneur's required human capital in the …nancing of a project over periods.
The venture capitalist stages …nancing to protect herself from hold-up by the entrepreneur.
In our model, the entrepreneur is compensated over time to protect the venture capitalist from hold-up, but the entrepreneur may also need protection from the venture capitalist which requires short-term vesting or control.
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) recognize the potential bene…t to purposely entrenching the manager with a contract to achieve e¢ cient investment. They do not examine the potential agency issues of diversion and asymmetric information, nor do they consider the possibilities of short-term vesting as a substitute for entrenchment. Gorton and Grundy (1996) show that when long-term vesting of manager equity pay is needed so the manager does not quit and free ride his equity o¤ the replacement manager's e¤ort, there is a bene…t to entrenching the manager (through control of the …rm). This is so he cannot be …red but rather will stay to vest his equity even when he is less e¢ cient as a manager ex-post, in order to provide him with e¤ort incentives ex-ante. We show similar entrepreneur control and entrenchment is bene…cial even if his human capital is vital so he cannot quit and free ride, but we also show when it is preferable to give the entrepreneur short-term vesting instead of control due to the larger agency costs of control from diversion and asymmetric information.
In Hellmann (1998) , the entrepreneur relinquishes control (including …ring rights) of the …rm in the initial contract to the venture capitalist and accepts a later payment because it protects the venture capitalist from hold-up if she later needs to search for superior management, which increases …rm value ex-ante. We show the entrepreneur may relinquish control in trade for short-term vesting, but for long-term vesting the entrepreneur requires control, otherwise long-term vesting is repudiated. Dessein (2001) is similar to our model in examining ex-ante asymmetric information of the entrepreneur's quality. He predicts that a good entrepreneur signals by giving up formal control in exchange for more de facto control, but does not examine the timing of compensation. We predict the opposite: a good entrepreneur receives more formal control, because he gives up short-term for long-term vesting. Kirilenko (2001) also models a venture capital …rm with asymmetric information, bargaining, and control rights, but also has no implications about the timing of the entrepreneur's compensation.
Landier (2001) models venture capital versus bank …nancing as depending on career concerns and project risk to explain U.S. versus European venture capital markets. In the conclusion, we show our model can be applied to explain venture capital versus bank (or analogously U.S. versus European) …nancing as depending on the ex-ante probability of good entrepreneur types and the quality of interim information. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) show empirically our prediction that when the entrepreneur receives cash ‡ows and control based on performance, vesting is most common. Our model predicts that control is needed to protect long-term vesting. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) show empirically that cash ‡ows, control and liquidation rights shift to the entrepreneur with performance in interrelated ways as complements, not substitutes, as we obtain, and they also show that venture capitalists are concerned about the entrepreneur's ability as a manager. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) show empirically that more complexity in contracts, which they interpret as an entrepreneur's human capital requirements, leads to more time contingent Kole (1997) shows empirically that corporate management compensation contracts are highly complex and variable across …rms.
Model
The model is presented here, and detailed discussion of the model assumptions, robustness and timing is in Appendix A. A timeline illustrates the steps of the project in Figure 3 .1.
At t = 0, an entrepreneur ("E" or "he") has a project that requires external funding K.
E chooses whether to pay irreversibly his only wealth M as seed costs to initiate the project, which makes him visible to venture capitalists. M is the monetary cost of developing a business model or building a prototype that E must perform before he can be known and approached by a venture capitalist. (An alternative interpretation is that M is E's pecuniary or non-pecuniary opportunity cost to pursue an entrepreneurial project q gives the probability that the bad type is revealed by the signal. Control rights contingent on s are given to either the VC or E: (s) 2 fV C; Eg: We refer to VC control if (s) = V C for s 2 f0; 1g; and E control or contingent control if (1) = E: After the signal, E chooses unobservable e¤ort e 2 f0; 1g. The cost of e¤ort is (e); where (0) = 0: 
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The interpretation of a veri…able positive payo¤ at project completion is an IPO or private sale of the …rm. Because the funds of an IPO or sale do not accrue privately to an individual party but are based on a legal contract of sale, the payo¤ is considered veri…able.
VC and E are risk neutral. E has no liability beyond W 1 since he has no further veri…able wealth after paying M; while VC has unlimited liability due to unlimited wealth. Without loss of generality, VC receives the payo¤ V and E receives payment W T from VC at t = 3;
where W T (c; s; ; V ) W 1 (c; s) + W 3 (c; s; ; V ): W 1 (c; s) is called "short-term vesting" and is determined at t = 1; and W 3 (c; s; ; V ) is called "long-term vesting" and is determined at t = 3: The contract speci…es W 1 and W T ; which implicitly gives W 3 : The utility for E is 
We de…ne k
, where V 1 V r de…nes the product of e¤ort. Since k < 1; e¤ort is always e¢ cient in an e¤ort-intensive project. We also assume (1)
At the beginning of t = 2, E, and VC if (s) = V C; can repudiate the contract with the threat of terminating the project, and (s) can repudiate with the threat of diverting L:
If there is a repudiation, the parties bargain over the surplus value from continuing rather than terminating the project, resulting in a Nash bargaining solution and e¢ cient ex-post termination and diversion actions. The outcome of the Nash bargaining solution is that each party receives its threat point, equal to its utility from termination and/or diverting L; plus half the surplus amount from continuing the project. Since the continuation value is not yet determined but will be veri…able at t = 3; E and VC can write a new contract to split the surplus contingent on V:
Control rights may be separately delegated from veri…able cash ‡ows, but control itself is a complex bundle of rights over bundled actions. The nature of a non-contractible action is that it either cannot be de…ned in a contract ex-ante or veri…ed ex-post. If there are more than one of these actions within a …rm, we argue that control over the actions may not be assignable to separate parties. In the present model, an interpretation is that control over the assets includes both the action of operating the assets for a secondary value and the action of operating the assets to impose non-pecuniary costs on E. An example of the latter under VC control is VC relocating the assets and E's o¢ ce to Antartica, such that E would prefer to quit. This also explains why it is not veri…able which party terminates the project under VC control. Assigning control rights to VC is not symmetric to assigning control rights to E.
Under VC control, VC termination is not veri…able as due to VC, but VC diversion of assets is veri…able. Under E control, E diversion of funds is not veri…able (due to the bad type's project paying zero), but termination is veri…able as due to E.
An innovation of the model is the choice between mutually exclusive project variants: a regular (non-e¤ort intensive project) or an e¤ort-intensive project. A good type E can choose c = r to produce payo¤ V R without special e¤ort. Alternatively, he can choose c = i to produce a higher payo¤ V 1 with e¤ort e = 1: Without e¤ort, the e¤ort-intensive project produces payo¤ V 0 : An interpretation of the project choice is that for c = r; E chooses to spend funds K on regular assets that give a payo¤ of V R : For c = i; E veri…ably spends V R V 0 of the funds K on special e¤ort-intensive assets. If E gives unveri…able e¤ort e = 1; the project pays o¤ V 1 :
If e = 0; the assets are wasted and reduce the project payo¤ by their cost, so the payo¤ is V 0 : A further interpretation of this project choice is that more expensive high capacity assets can be purchased, which will give greater pro…t if E gives e¤ort to produce at full capacity. If regular capacity assets are purchased, money is saved and can be spent to produce at lower 8 capacity without the e¤ort of E. But high capacity assets without E's e¤ort wastes money and results in the lowest production. An alternative interpretation of the project choice is that in the e¤ort-intensive project, V R V 0 is spent to enhance E's e¤ort productivity, which increases output if e = 1 but is wasted if e = 0:
Results
Before examining the general optimization problem and formally de…ning an equilibrium, we …rst show some basic results. We denote equilibrium values with asterisks. Since s = 0 implies E is bad, E will never receive control contingent on s = 0; VC will …re E and divert L, and short-term and long-term vesting are zero: W 1 (s = 0) = 0 and W 3 (s = 0) = 0: For simplicity, we suppress the argument s; so W 1 (c) and W 3 (V ) refer to s = 1:
If the project completion value is zero, either E is bad or E has diverted funds, so longterm vesting is always zero: W 3 (0) = 0: Since the project completion payo¤ outcome of V 2 fV r ; V 1 ; V 0 g is determined by veri…able project choice, we write long-term vesting W 3 (V ) as W 3 when long-term vesting as determined by project choice is understood. Similarly, we write W 1 (c) as W 1 ; when short-term vesting as determined by project choice is understood. Since project choice is clear given outcome V; total vesting W T (V; c) can be expressed as W T (V ); which can be written without the argument as W T when the project outcome is clear.
Hold-up and Repudiation Results
Under VC control, a termination results in threat point payo¤s of W 1 (c; s) to E and L W 1 (c; s) to VC. E's repudiation-proof long-term vesting is half the surplus of V L; where V 2 f0; V r ; V 1 ; V 0 g: E and VC can split the surplus contingent on the outcome, even though the outcome of the surplus as a function of e is known by E but not necessarily by VC, because the e¤ort decision has already been made at the time of bargaining, the renegotiated compensation can be contracted upon the realization of e¤ort revealed through V (c; e); and E can take no action based on his asymmetric information after bargaining other than his threat point of quitting. Bargaining ensures ex-post e¢ ciency. Since a bad E type's project always has a negative surplus outcome of L; he prefers to quit. A bad project is always terminated and the bad type receives only short-term vesting W 1 : For the good type, the project is not terminated or diverted. This gives under VC control
The repudiation-proof constraint under VC control is
where V (c; e) 2 fV 1 ; V r ; V 0 g: This implies repudiation-proof long-term vesting is
Under E control, VC cannot …re E so an early termination is veri…ably due to E quitting.
Long-term vesting can be contracted contingent on the …nal outcome and VC cannot repudiate it. Short-term vesting is set as W 1 = 0; in order to reduce the amount that the bad type can receive and the good type can use as bargaining power, as seen below. This does not restrict the maximum amount for which W T can be contracted. E can repudiate with the threat of diverting funds L, which would lead to a …nal …rm payo¤ of zero. E's threat point is L and VC's threat point is zero. Again, the solution is that E and VC split the surplus contingent on the outcome. The bad type's project has a negative surplus outcome of L: Since he has limited liability, long-term vesting can only be zero, and the bad type diverts L: For the good type, since VC cannot repudiate long-term vesting, E always chooses the e¤ort-intensive project and gives e¤ort. This gives under E control
As above, the surplus from bargaining is
The E control repudiation proof constraint is:
If c = r; e = 0 since e¤ort is costly and provides no additional return. If c = i; our assumption of (1) < 1 2 (V 1 V 0 ) implies that the good type always supplies e¤ort, as follows. E's short-term vesting W 1 is paid before e¤ort and so cannot depend on it. Under VC control, E's utility subject to (RP VC ) is
Since
due to our assumption of (1)
; E would never give e¤ort under VC control. Since e¤ort cannot be incentivized with W 1 ; our assumption about (1) allows us to focus on the e¤ort-intensive project choice. We examine the trade-o¤ of short-term vesting and E control as incentives for E to choose the e¤ort-intensive project choice.
There is a pooling equilibrium and the binding budget constraint for VC (discussed further below) is p(V (e)
> 0; e = argmax e U E (e) = 1: Thus, E always gives e¤ort. Since the good type is indi¤erent to a contract that pays W 3 (V 0 ) = 0 under VC or E control, we assume this for simplicity.
We introduce the e¤ort-related project choice c 2 fi; rg to consider a new variant of contracting for e¤ort when there are incomplete contracts. E's decision to choose the e¤ort-intensive project at t = 0 is di¤erent than his choice to give e¤ort at t = 1 after the e¤ort-intensive project has been chosen. The repudiation-proof results show that under VC control, unveri…able e¤ort cannot be contracted. W 1 is paid before e¤ort, and
gives E a …xed, non-contractible exposure to the product of his e¤ort of 1 2 : Instead, we show how short-term vesting can give incentives to E to choose an e¤ort-intensive project. Under VC control, E will choose the e¤ort-intensive project if the extra compensation he receives from short-term vesting for choosing the e¤ort-intensive project is greater than the cost of e¤ort he will take. Under E control, long-term vesting can be contracted so E can be paid the full cost of his e¤ort in long-term vesting, and E will choose the e¤ort-intensive project.
Our assumption that k > 1 2 allows us to focus on interesting cases, seen below, in which either some amount of short-term vesting or E control is always necessary for E to recover his cost of e¤ort so that he is willing to choose the e¤ort-intensive project. If instead k 1 2 ; E would always choose an e¤ort-intensive project and e¤ort during the project since he always receives at least half the product of his e¤ort from his split over the bargaining surplus.
Equity Shares Interpretation
The general contract that pays W 1 and W 3 contingent on any veri…able information can be interpreted in terms of vesting of an actual equity compensation contract. This shows why under VC control, apparent short-term vested equity is insensitive to e¤ort, and long-term vesting has a non-contractible sensitivity to e¤ort. Consider a contract at t = 0 that speci…es VC control and nominal equity shares of the project paid to E of e 1 (s = 1; c) short-term vesting and e 3 (s = 1; c) long-term vesting. If the project is terminated, E receives e 1 L:
Thus, the repudiation-proof value of E's equity is (
; rather than necessarily (e 1 + e 3 )V (c): E's repudiation-proof equity vesting can be interpreted as
The sensitivity for a given c to e of b 1 V (c) is zero and of b 3 V (c) is …xed at 1 2 : Thus, short-term vesting cannot give E incentives for taking e¤ort, though it does give incentives for choosing the e¤ort-intensive project. The e¤ort incentives from long-term vesting are not contractible, since they are …xed at 
Optimization Problem
Since the venture capital market for …nancing is competitive, and projects accepted by the good type are pro…table, while those accepted by the bad type are not, VC o¤ers a competitive contract to maximize the good type's utility, subject to constraints. The optimization problem is given as:
where VC's individual rationality constraints (or budget constraints) for pooling and separation are, respectively,
The good type's individual rationality constraint is given by (IR). His incentive constraint for the e¤ort-intensive project choice is given by (IC c ) and for e¤ort is given by (IC e ). Constraints gives full up-front vesting to provide E with incentives to choose the e¤ort-intensive project.
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VC o¤ers no contract to the bad type and a repudiation-proof contract to the good type with
No Diversion of Funds If the agent in control of the assets is not able to operate the assets early to divert funds, E control is e¢ cient because the bad type cannot divert and E cannot hold up VC with the threat to divert under E control. VC o¤ers a contract with E control,
High Quality Interim Signal If the signal quality q is high enough,= L M L ; and V 1 2K + L; VC can o¤er E control. The bad type does not pool because of the probability that he will be caught, and the good type cannot hold up VC because (RP E ) is satis…ed. VC o¤ers an e¤ort-intensive contract with E control, W 1 = 0; and W T = V 1 K:
Limited Optimal Results
With the combination of non-veri…able termination actions, ex-ante asymmetric information, diversion of funds, and a noisy interim signal, the model has limited optimal results. The bad type pools for any contract that gives E control or large enough short-term vesting, so optimal results requires that the contract has VC control with limited short-term vesting. However, E will only choose the e¤ort-intensive project if the short-term vesting incentive is large enough to overcome the e¤ort cost. We de…ne the level of incentives for E to choose the e¤ort-intensive project as W T (V 1 ) W T (V r ) k ; which is the amount of slack in constraint (IC c ). Our discussion of the model often focuses on the level of incentives, which is continuous, rather than just on the choice of the e¤ort-intensive project, which is discrete, because a higher level of incentives will induce the e¤ort-intensive project choice for a higher cost of e¤ort k:
For a contract with E control, E can be contracted with long-term vesting the entire product of his e¤ort : E will always choose the e¤ort-intensive project and give e¤ort. But the expected value of pooling to the bad type is (1 q)L > M due to diverting L; so the bad type always pools. There is no separating equilibrium and hence no optimal results.
To illustrate a range of parameter values for which the surplus value and the product of e¤ort are not too large, such that optimal results hold with VC control, separation and the e¤ort-intensive project, consider implying that the objective function in (4.1) is maximized for c 2 fi; rg: Finally,
hence (IC c ) implies c = i: Also,
so (IR) holds.
A key reason that optimal results are achieved for this parameter is that W 1 (c) is sensitive to the value of c; as shown in (4.5), even under the constraint for separation that W 1 (c) Highly entrepreneurial projects are those for which E's human capital value of the project, based on V r ; is relatively large, such that the short-term vesting that can be paid for a regular project according to VC's individual rationality constraint under separation and (RP VC ) is binding:
Any projects that are not highly entrepreneurial we call "semi-entrepreneurial"projects since E still adds value: V r > K > L: The group of all highly entrepreneurial and semi-entrepreneurial projects are called entrepreneurial projects.
Results for Highly Entrepreneurial Projects

Tradeo¤ of E¤ort-Intensive Project and Separation
Under (HE), separation with VC control is viable for all p and q < q, but implies that the e¤ort-intensive project is not chosen. The surplus on a regular project is large enough that VC can recover all her investment from the half of the surplus she receives from repudiation, and E receives the maximum possible amount under separation, 
Equilibrium Results
The possible types of equilibria for highly entrepreneurial projects are illustrated in Figure   4 .1, with the probability of a good type p on the x-axis and the signal quality q on the yaxis. The divided regions illustrate the resulting equilibria classi…ed as separating or pooling, e¤ort-intensive projects or regular projects, and VC control or E control. In Region 4, the 1 If a contract with a non-equity based payment W0 > 0 to E was possible conditional on E revealing he was a bad type at t = 0; before VC invested K; there would be no pooling equilibria in which projects were invested with bad types. Instead, bad types would either pool or separate regarding investing M to then receive W0 = (1 q)W1: Thus, the general results of separating and pooling solutions implying a trade-o¤ of e¤ort incentives versus screening would remain. There is no W0 > 0 possible in the present model with equity-based compensation. Any equity share 0 > 0 would have zero value W0 = 0; since there would be no residual value. The project would not be started and hence would have zero liquidation value. Region 4, separation, is viable for all highly entrepreneurial projects, for all p and q.
However, the good type prefers the solution speci…ed in Regions 1-3 for their corresponding levels of p and q; when they give him greater pro…t, as shown in Figure 4 .1, and so these are the resulting equilibria solving (4.1) when they are viable for values of p and q. Region i is the equilibrium rather than Region j if p is large enough such that p > p i;j ; where
The viability of each region in Figure 4 .1 depends on conditions implicit in p > p i;j from the appropriate p i;j above, such that the surplus V r L is large enough and the product of e¤ort is of appropriate size. 4. Region 4, separation with VC control and a non-e¤ort intensive project, for the lowest levels of p; or for moderate levels of p and high levels of q :
if (1), (2) and (3) do not hold.
Proof. See the Appendix.
E¤ort-Intensive Project and Cost of Pooling
We de…ne the cost of pooling to be the expected amount of …nancing of a bad project that is not recovered by VC plus the expected amount of vesting and diversion of funds that is received by the bad type in a pooling equilibrium. Both of these occur in a pooling equilibrium in which bad types pool due to the bene…ts of E control or high short-term vesting, but would not occur in a separating equilibrium. We call this amount a cost because it both decreases VC's ability to recover K from the project, decreasing the project's viability regarding VC's individual rationality constraint, and ine¢ ciently decreases the amount of short-term vesting or E control, decreasing a good type's incentives to choose the e¤ort-intensive project. The expected cost of pooling due to ine¢ cient investment is (1 p)(K L); due to short-term vesting paid to the bad type under VC control is (1 q)(1 p)W 1 ; and due to diversion by the bad type under E control is (1 q)(1 p)L:
VC pro…ts under separation with VC control and no e¤ort-intensive project are also ine¢ -cient. They are amounts that under separation cannot be paid to the good type for incentives to choose the e¤ort-intensive project. The equilibrium contract is the one that maximizes the good type's utility and depends upon the trade-o¤ of the cost of pooling and cost of VC pro…t under separation.
The expected costs of pooling are relatively low for high p and q; when the ex-ante probability of bad types is low and the probability of catching bad types with the signal after contracting is high. When costs of pooling are relatively low, E control is viable. This gives E the greatest incentives to choose the e¤ort-intensive project, which he always chooses under The levels of p and q may also be loosely interpreted as corresponding to levels of due diligence and monitoring, respectively. Greater due diligence performed by VC before the project would increase the chance of weeding out bad types and so increase p: This is independent of the screening role played by the contract o¤ered. If bad types know there is a chance of being denied for funding even if they pay M to look for funding, fewer will try. Greater monitoring by VC during the life of the project may increase q; the quality of the interim signal. Hence, results of the model may give insight into the trade-o¤ of better due diligence versus better monitoring by VC. However, this is only a loose interpretation, since p and q are exogenous.
Also, actual due diligence would occur after M is paid but before K is invested, whereas p is the probability of E's type before E decides to pay M:
The following two propositions give comparative statics for changes in p and q: The results for changes in p hold for all p. The results for changes in q hold for all q except for between Regions 1 and 4, 2 and 4, and 1 and 3, due to nonlinearities in q there and the switch from pooling to separating equilibria.
Proposition 3. Under assumption (HE), as p decreases:
E control, short-term vesting plus E diversion of funds, incentives for and choice of the e¤ort-intensive project, and level of e¤ort decrease weakly, and the equilibrium changes weakly from pooling to separating.
A decrease in p or q has similar e¤ects on E control plus diversion, short-term vesting, incentives, and e¤ort-intensive project choice, but they have opposite e¤ects on a pooling versus separating equilibrium obtaining, as seen in the next proposition. E control, short-term vesting plus possible E diversion of funds, incentives for and choice of the e¤ort-intensive project, and level of e¤ort decrease weakly, and the equilibrium changes weakly from separating to pooling.
We now explain the di¤erence in comparative statics between p and q: As p decreases to zero in the limit, high short-term vesting becomes in…nitely costly in relation to the bene…t to good types, so separation is eventually preferable for the good type. As q decreases to zero, pooling may still allow for large enough short-term vesting that it is preferred over separation, and may even allow for large enough e¤ort incentives that the e¤ort-intensive project is chosen.
However, Figure 4 .1 shows that as q decreases the equilibrium may turn from separating to pooling (from Region 4 to 3) even without the e¤ort-intensive project being chosen. As q decreases, both pooling and separation costs increase, reducing the good type's possible shortterm vesting under pooling, or under separation as the M 1 q cap decreases. However, capped short-term vesting available under separation decreases with q faster than possible short-term vesting under pooling decreases with q. This is because the cost of pooling due to losses in investment (1 p)(K L) is independent of q: Only the cost of pooling due to the ex-post short-term vesting paid to the bad type, (1 p)(1 q)W 1 ; increases with q: Thus, short-term vesting under pooling,
; does not decrease as fast as capped short-term vesting under separation, M 1 q ; the entire amount of which is sensitive to q: When q is so low as to be a nearly informationless signal, the good type may lose more in pro…t to VC under separation than he would lose in the cost of pooling to the bad type under pooling, so pooling is selected. For a high q, separation gives a high cap making it more attractive than pooling.
As q decreases, pooling is eventually chosen when the separation-capped vesting eventually falls below the possible pooling short-term vesting amount. Although the bad types who avoid detection at t = 1 receive lower short-term vesting, their ex-ante expected pro…t increases because their decreasing chance of being caught dominates.
In the case of p decreasing, the cost of pooling also increases. This decreases short-term vesting to the good type under pooling. However, the capped short-term vesting available under separation is unchanged with p: Thus, for low enough p; separation is eventually preferred.
Furthermore, q occurs after the investment of K, while p occurs before K: The decrease in q implies no increase in the cost to investment within the pooling region, whereas the decrease in p does, so separation is eventually required for low enough p: Since the signal is after investment, marginal decreases in q do not increase the initial investment amount in bad projects. Conversely, marginal decreases in p increase the investment in bad projects since p is before the investment decision.
Importance of Control Rights
The model shows not only the importance of short-term versus long-term vesting but gives a new explanation for control rights. Control rights and short-term vesting are imperfect substitutes for providing e¤ort-intensive project incentives, whereas control rights and longterm vesting are compliments. E control acts to entrench E in the …rm in order to protect long-term vesting from hold-up. Thus, E control over residual actions in the …rm allows for contracting E to receive the veri…able residual cash ‡ows at t = 2 without hold-up, giving full e¤ort-intensive project incentives.
Without E control, no amount of short-term vesting gives full e¤ort-intensive project incentives. Short-term vesting incentives may be large enough to induce E to choose the e¤ort-intensive project for a given p if the fractional cost of e¤ort k is not too large, but the next proposition shows that for any p; there is some k above which for all k > k; short-term vesting does not induce the e¤ort-intensive project. Under VC control, short-term vesting can never viably pay the good type the full value of the product of e¤ort if there is any asymmetric information (p < 1): VC receives half of the product of e¤ort due to hold-up, and pays the good type for this through additional short-term vesting. However, bad types receive some 21 of this additional short-term vesting, limiting the extent to which the good type can capture proceeds from the product of his e¤ort. E control always induces the e¤ort-intensive project because it makes E the residual claimant so he receives the full product of e¤ort .
Proposition 5. Under E control, E has full e¤ort-intensive project incentives and the e¤ort-intensive project is chosen for all p < 1 and k < 1. Under VC control and assumption (HE), for any p 0 < 1; there exists a k(p 0 ) < 1 such that, for all k > k(p 0 ); E would not choose the e¤ort-intensive project.
This result that assigning control rights to E is sometimes necessary for optimal actions is similar to that found in the incomplete contracts literature. However, this literature typically relies on non-pecuniary private bene…ts from control for which monetary payments cannot compensate. We show that even without private bene…ts, contractible monetary payments to E are not large enough to compensate for the monetary bene…ts gained from E control. Control is worth more in pecuniary terms to good types than to bad types or to VC. Due to the special problems of asymmetric information combined with hold-up, there is a distinction between contingent control and contingent compensation, because short-term vesting is an imperfect substitute for E control. With greater short-term vesting, bad types would not purchase control but would keep the payment. Short-term vesting of W 1 (i) marginally greater than L is more costly for satisfying VC's individual rationality constraint than E control, and worth less to E than control.
Although for simplicity we assume in our model that E can choose e¤ort levels of only zero or one, if e¤ort choice were a continuous variable between zero and one (with appropriate variable e¤ort costs and e¤ort-intensive project choices and payo¤s) we would achieve intermediary results. A graph of equilibria regions with continuous levels of e¤ort would look similar to Only E control could induce optimal e¤ort and the e¤ort-intensive project in a continuous model.
An interpretation of E control is that by having equity-like residual control rights over the …rm, E also has full equity-like residual cash ‡ow rights and thus equity-like incentives. When VC cedes control rights, she has a debt-like claim. Under VC control, VC has more equity or ownership-type control rights and cash ‡ow rights and E has more of an employment-type 22 …xed wage. The contingent nature of the control rights helps make the contingent employee or owner nature of E's position possible, so that the owner incentives are possible to give to E on a contingent basis.
Conclusion
We examine venture capital contracting to show how a hold-up problem constrains contracting from providing incentives for hidden action e¤ort and from screening against asymmetric information. A new model of a veri…able e¤ort-intensive project choice is introduced. Shortterm vesting of equity provides incentives for the e¤ort-intensive project choice but reduces screening. The equilibrium depends upon the value of e¤ort versus the cost of pooling, according to ex-ante levels of asymmetric information and an interim signal. Control rights are complementary to long-term vesting and give full e¤ort incentives. Short-term vesting is only a partial substitute for control rights.
An application of the model is that since the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist can extract rents through repudiation, control and up-front payments must be given to the more valuable party to protect their larger claim to payo¤s. During times when entrepreneurial projects are expected to have smaller pro…ts, the entrepreneur is not as essential to the …rm, or managerial skill or the entrepreneur's ability is hard to distinguish, the entrepreneur would extract too much pro…t. He has to give the venture capitalist control and accept smaller short-term vesting. The control rights that the venture capitalist requires to allow her to break even actually leads to the venture capitalist making larger than competitive pro…ts in a separating equilibrium. This may provide a new explanation to the empirical puzzle regarding the apparent excess returns attained by venture capitalists.
Alternatively, during times when entrepreneurial projects have very high pro…ts or technologies for which the entrepreneur is essential, the venture capitalist would extract too many rents. The venture capitalist must give up control and give easy investment terms that ex-post looks ine¢ cient for the cases of bad entrepreneurs who were …nanced and failed, but ex-ante is constrained-e¢ cient in order to satisfy and protect the highly valuable e¤orts of the good entrepreneurs. This may partially explain in the dot-com boom, which was heavily venture capital-…nanced, why many of the failed startups may appear to have been given excessive …nancing and management control, but several …rms had very large success.
The model can also be interpreted as a comparison of banking or debt markets versus venture capital …nancing, in a setup of only one round of …nancing and one cash ‡ow. When asymmetric risk is low, a large fraction of entrepreneurs are good, or when a signal is correlated highly enough with the continuation value of the …rm (such as if loan default signals insolvency and not just illiquidity), banks or debt markets can …nance entrepreneurs (which is equivalent to entrepreneur control in our model). In this case, the …nancing party has no control over the …rm except as provided by contracting on the signal. Giving up the control to …re or renegotiate with the entrepreneur is acceptable when the signal protects the outside investor enough. However, when asymmetric risk is high, many entrepreneurs are bad, or the quality of the signal is low, …rms should be …nanced by venture capitalists who hold control of the …rm (which is equivalent to venture capitalist control in our model), and who can more actively manage and renegotiate when needed. Finally, the model can be seen as a hybrid of the property rights model of the …rm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990 ) and the agency model of the …rm. Our model combines the question of which party should have control rights in the face of hold-up and exante investment decisions with the problem of the separation of ownership and management in the face of asymmetric information and hidden action. In our model, the entrepreneur has the up-front choice of taking the e¤ort-intensive project, which is similar to an up-front investment decision, and the entrepreneur is the party with valuable human capital. The property rights perspective implies that the entrepreneur should receive control rights to protect him from hold-up so that he maximizes his "investment"of taking the e¤ort-intensive project. However, the party receiving control is not an owner-manager as in the property rights literature but rather the agent of the other party who is the owner. As an agent his type is unknown and the diversion action is not observable. From the agency perspective, the venture capitalist should hold control rights to mitigate the asymmetric information and diversion problems. We show how the assignment of control rights depends on the extent of the hold-up versus agency problems in a combined model. We also show when assigning short-term vesting can be a substitute tool that provides a better solution than assigning control rights to the party with the greatest human capital and investment needs, in order to overcome hold-up in the face of agency problems. DeMarzo and Fishman (2000) argue that repudiation is not a credible threat and that the other party should be able to enforce the original contract in court. Resorting to a court enforcement is not possible in the present model. Under VC control, the only court-veri…able information is whether there is a termination, not who the terminating party is. Gromb (1994) shows that in an in…nitely repeated game of lending without collateral, the principal's inability to commit not to renegotiate implies she can make only zero pro…t, because no outcome of the game can rely on a threat that is Pareto dominated by the outcome (the latter shown by Farrell and Maskin (1989) ).
Other approaches to modeling long-term contracts as inherently non-contractible due to indescribableness or unveri…able actions would result in a similar outcome as our model. Assume that continuation of the …rm at t = 2 depends on multiple rounds of staged …nancing (as shown in several papers, e.g. Neher (1999)), and that long-term vesting cannot be contracted until the staged …nancing is completed. The renegotiation that is voluntary and welfare-improving for both parties gives the same results as repudiation in our model. Although long-term VC contracts including vesting are typically used in reality, they are commonly updated due to events such as re…nancing. In practice, long-term vesting and equity ownership is often either formally or implicitly renegotiated. Baker and Gompers (1999) show empirically that equity investments by venture capitalists just before an IPO reduce CEO ownership by about half, and this dilution is only partially mitigated by measures undertaken that are designed to do so. This implies that VC contracts are not complete and are subject to unilateral renegotiation as we assume.
Robustness to the Timing of Events The timing of the unveri…able termination action by E or VC and divert action by the party in control is not important for our results. Since repudiation depends on the threat of taking one of the unveri…able actions, it occurs at the time of the unveri…able actions. However, the unveri…able termination and divert actions could occur at any time or multiple times during the life of the project and not signi…cantly change the results.
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The unveri…able actions could occur any time up to the …nal veri…able sale of the …rm at t = 3. If the agent in control were to operate the assets and divert the cash ‡ows just before t = 3; the diversion value is still only L and the assets expire worthless. If the assets have not been diverted by t = 3; the …rm is sold for a veri…able price and thus the agent loses control at the time of the sale and no longer can divert the assets. If the unveri…able actions were to occur before the signal at t = 2; repudiation would also occur earlier. Since short-term vesting must be paid at or before the possibility of repudiation, short-term vesting would be paid before the signal and could not be conditional on the signal. The signal then could not be contracted upon, and the outcome would be the same as when the quality of the signal is zero. If the unveri…able actions were to occur at the beginning of the project, short-term vesting would be paid at the signing of the contract at t = 0: If the unveri…able actions were to occur multiple times or continuously throughout the life of the project, the model results would be una¤ected. The signal could occur after e¤ort and be a function of e¤ort as well as of E's type. This would give some ability to contract short-term vesting on realized e¤ort directly. Modeling the signal as uncorrelated with e¤ort simpli…es the model and makes the goal of inducing e¤ort more di¢ cult, to highlight the trade-o¤ of better e¤ort incentives at the cost of pooling using short-term vesting and contingent control.
Under R 2 ; solving (VC P ) and (RP VC ) for wages gives
The bad type's incentive constraint to pool is satis…ed. Thus, all constraints for (4.1) are satis…ed, so R 2 is viable.
Substituting and solving for p; W T (R 2 )
(1) > W T (R 4 ) is equivalent to p > p 2;4 ; and
Under R 1 ; solving (VC P ) and (RP E ) for wages gives The inequality R 1 > R 3 is equivalent to
Su¢ cient for (5.2) is:
The solution of (5.2) is given by the solution to the quadratic equation dQ dp j k 1;p 1 < 0; this implies that for k < 1; p + 1 in order to be a root of Q = 0: Hence, when p < 1; the solution to (5.3) is p 2 (p ; p + ); so the relevant solution is p > p 1;3 p > 0:
If p 1; then since dQ dk < 0 and dQ dp j k 1;p 1 < 0; p < 1 for all k < 1; and p + 1; so there is no solution for p < 1:
The viable solution that uniquely solves (4.1), and is hence the unique equilibrium, is: where the condition for R 4 always holds if the conditions for R i 2 fR 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 g do not hold.
Proof of Proposition 3. For any q and for any Regions i and j de…ned by Proposition 2 such that i < j; where i 2 f1; 2; 3g and j 2 f2; 3; 4g; any point (p i ; q) in Region i must be such that p i > p i;j (q); and any point (p j ; q) in Region j must be such that p j p i;j (q); hence p j < p i : Thus, for a …xed q; as p decreases, the equilibrium region increases in cardinal value.
For an increase in cardinal value of region numbers, Regions 2, 3, and 4 have VC control and Region 1 has E control, so E control decreases weakly among regions. Within regions there is no change. Regions 1 and 2 have e¤ort-intensive projects and e = 1 while Regions 3 and 4
do not, so the e¤ort-intensive project and the level of e¤ort decrease weakly among regions.
Within regions, there is no change. Region 4 has separation while Regions 1, 2 and 3 have pooling, so there is a change from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium. Within regions there is no change.
The level of incentives for each region is the good type's utility value of choosing the e¤ort-intensive project in the given region, as follows. For R 1 : Short-term vesting plus diversion of funds is constant within Regions 1 and 4. Within Region 2, d dp
Within Region 3, d dp
Thus, the level of short-term vesting plus diversion of funds decreases within Regions 2 and 3. For any p and for Region pairs (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (2; 3); (4; 3)g de…ned by Proposition 2, any point (p; q i ) in Region i must be such that q i > q i;j (p) and any point (p; q j ) in Region j must be such that q j q i;j (p); hence q j < q i : Thus, for a …xed p; as q decreases, the equilibrium region changes from Region i to j. For such a change of regions, Regions 2, 3, and 4 have VC control and Region 1 has E control, so E control decreases weakly among regions. Within regions there is no change. Regions 1 and 2 have e¤ort-intensive projects and e = 1 while Regions 3 and 4 do not, so the e¤ort-intensive project and the level of e¤ort decrease weakly among regions.
Within regions, there is no change. Region 4 has separation while Regions 1, 2 and 3 have pooling, so there is weakly a change from a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium.
Within regions there is no change.
The level of incentives for each region is the value of choosing the e¤ort-intensive project as follows. R 1 :
(1) W T (R 1 ; r) = (1 k) :
